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INTRODUCTION
The concept of targeting soil conservation efforts and funds to areas
where they can be most effective has drawn increasing interest in recent
years. Revelations such as that over half of the conservation practices
partially funded through the federal Agricultural Conservation Program had
been applied to land without serious erosion problems raised the need for
a more efficient allocation of public resources. A resurgence of public
interest in the problem of erosion and closer scrutiny of the effectiveness
of virtually all government programs has added emphasis to the search for
new approaches to soil conservationpolicy.
Soil erosion does impose significant agricultural and environmental
costs on society. Erosion of the topsoil exceeding the rate at which it is
naturally regenerated poses a threat to the long term productive capacity
of farmland, although the confounding effects of improved capital inputs
and management over the past forty years make the relationship between soil
loss and agricultural productivity difficult to quantify (Ogg et al, 1982). ——
Erosion from agricultural land causes extensive environmental damage as well.
It has been estimated that 4 billion tons of sediment enter United States
waterways annually, 3 billion tons of which originate in agriculture.
Waterborne sediment damages, in the form of costs of dredging silt from
rivers and harbors, reduced life of reservoirs, downstream flooding, and
other damages, were estimated in the 1960’s to cost $500 million annually
(Pimentaletal, 1976). With the increase in erosion that is generally agreed ——
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to have accompanied the grain export boom of the 1970’s (Heady,
the conversion to 1983 dollars,
much higher today.
Sedimentationalso imposes
even more difficult to assess.
the cost of sediment damages is
1982), and
undoubtedly
a range of environmental damages that are
Siltation and turbidity caused by agricultural
runoff can destroy fish and wildlife habitat and otherwise reduce recreational
and aesthetic values. Chemical residues entering the water with sediment
from agricultural land may cause environmentaldamages in the future that
are not even anticipated at present. Although difficult to measure precisely,
the magnitude of benefits that could be realized from more effective control
of soil erosion is thus potentially very great.
This paper will outline an approach to targeting soil conservation
efforts that rests upon an analysis of physical, economic, and institutional
parameters, Within this con~ext, the literature on the relationship between
soil erosion and some common arrangements of land ownership and control will
be examined to provide insights useful in the formulation of public policy
and to suggest further opportunities for research.
A Targeting Strategy in Three Dimensions
Current federal soil conservation policies are based on the principle
of voluntary cooperation by farm owners and operators, pursued through
education, technical assistance, and cost-sharing for the installationof
erosion control devices such as terraces. If future policies are to continue
to rely on voluntary participation, an appropriate soil conservation strategy
must take into considerationnot only physical and economic variables such as
average rates of erosion or costs per ton of erosion reduction, but also thesocial, cultural, economic,
farm owner or operator must
-3-
and legal context within which the individual
decide whether or not to undertake a voluntary
program of conservation.
the key to the success of
of the circumstances that
If the individual’sdecision to
our soil conservation policies,






The basis for an
policies.
effective targeting strategy must be a reliable data
base detailing the physical magnitude of current soil erosion. While this
data base has been greatly improved in recent years due to efforts such as
the 1977 National Resources Inventory, there remain many important physical
parameters and relationshipswhich have not been adequately defined. Two
of the most critical gaps
soil loss from particular
dislodged by erosion that
Net soil loss from a
dislodged by erosion that
in current knowledge relate to the extent of net
tracts of land, and the proportion of sediment
actually finds its way into water bodies.
given field is that proportion of the material
is actually transported out of the field and not
merely from one location to another within the field. The use of the
Universal Soil Loss Equation (USLE), designed to estimate the amount of
soil moved by water from its original position, to depict the amount of
topsoil irretreivablylost to the farmer due to erosion overstates the
true extent of those losses. Soil collects in depressions, along fence lines,
and at the toes of field slopes, thus effecting a transfer of some topsoil
and fertility within the field that must be
movement predicted by the USLE (Wischmeier,
so frequentlymisunderstood or ignored that
subtracted from the gross soil
1977). This point has been
one observor has suggested that-4-
“1OSS” in the USLE be replaced with “displacement” (Cook, 1982).
The divergence between soil movement as predicted by the USLE and actual
losses of soil from individual farms holds important implications for
individual farmers trying to assess whether or not to invest in soil
conservation (Miller,1982). At the aggregate level, matters are complicated
further by the effects of soil transportedbetween farms, as in the case of
soil washing from a cornfield onto an adjacent pasture owned by another farmer,
or soil deposited on floodplains far downstream. In these cases the net loss
of soil resources would appear to be less than that suggested by the USLE, and
the cost of such erosion in terms of productivity losses would perhaps be
less than anticipated. The available data are thus not entirely adequate
for describing the physical phenomena that underlie any potential losses
in productivity.
A similar problem exists in determining the contribution of individual
tracts of land to stream sedimentationand other water quality problems.
Even at the watershed level, sediment delivery ratios, which denote the
fraction of displaced soil actually entering waterways, can vary from .06
or less to as high as .50, depending on the size of the watershed, soil
types, and topography (Cook, 1982). Sediment loadings from individual tracts
can be even more difficult to predict, although efforts are underway to develop
sophisticated field-levelmodels of soil movement and delivery (Osteen et al, ——
1981).
The currently available data base is thus inadequate for measuring pre-
cisely the extent of net soil losses from erosion or the amount of sediment
entering waterways as a result. As one writer put it, “We just do not know
very well where the eroded soil goes.” (Cook, 1982, p. 91) When added to-5-
the uncertainty over the degree to which soil losses result in agricultural
productivity losses, a great deal of ambiguity is introduced into the physical
parameters that underly the economic analysis of soil conservation problems.
Three researchers recently observed that none of the economic analyses of
the effects of soil erosion that they had encountered had been based on a
sophisticatedmodel of the physical processes involved (Osteen et al, 1981). .—
Effective targeting of soil conservation programs requires that scientists
achieve a more detailed
particular practices in
depth and structure and
difficult and costly to
understanding of the physical relationshipsbetween
a given location and the actual impact on soil
on watierquality. While such an understandingwill be
achieve, and probably will never be accomplished
completely, it is important that economists recognize the limitations of the
physical parameters on which Eheir analyses rest and that they urge their
continued refinement.
Economic Parameters
A second dimension of analysis necessary for effective targeting is
the attachment of economic values to physical parameters. At the aggregate
level, the economist’s aim should be to identify the social costs and benefits
of marginal changes in the amount of soil lost from agricultural use or
deposited in streams and rivers. Ideally, to allow precision in targeting,
this analysis of costs and benefits should be done with as detailed a
geographic focus as the physical data base will permit. Marginal costs per ton
per acre of erosion reduction vary according to soil types, cropping patterns,
topography,and types of conservation practices employed. The marginal benefits
to society of erosion and sedimentation reductions are even more elusive,-6-
particularly in the case of improved water quality, which confers a range of
recreational and aesthetic benefits that for the most part are not traded in
private markets and are difficult to value. Differences in sediment yields
between fields in a given watershed, as well as differences in the economic
value of sediment reductions among watersheds, suggest that if water quality
is to be a consideration in targeting soil conservation efforts, the most
appropriate focus of evaluation should be areas within critical watersheds
which have high delivery
This approach is of
mentioned, the available
rates.
course replete with difficulties. As already
physical data appear to be inadequate to the task.
Much necessary economic analysis remains undone as well. While it is possible
in concept to evaluate the costs and benefits of changes in the quality and
character of environmentalresources, it is extremely difficult to do so in
practice, and this difficulty has been noted frequently in the literature
(Krutillaand Fisher, 1975; Freeman, 1979).





(Ogg etal, 1982). Using data from the 1977 National Resources .—
number of counties with at least some land eroding at rates in
tons per acre per year were identified. By placing the less than
cropland currently eroding at this rate in adequate conservation
practices, over 30 percent of the gross soil loss by weight from land currently
eroding at rates in excess of 5 tons per acre could be eliminated. This would
also allow a considerable reduction in costs per ton of erosion control over
current programs. The critical link in their analysis is the assumption “that
a ton of soil conserved on a steep field with a shallow topsoil is as
valuable in maintaining productivity as conserving a ton of soil on a
relatively non-erosive field.” It was also assumed, at least implicitly,-7-
that each ton of erosion reduction anywhere has an identical value in terms
of improved water quality. The proposal later concedes, however, that
“erosion’s impacts on water quality and crop yields are unknown on most
erosive soils,” and that “the benefits of conserving soil... seem to depend
upon several parameters that have yet
While the constraints imposed by
as well as the political difficulties
to be researched.” (Ogget al., 1982, p. 71) .—
data limitationsmust be acknowledged,
confronting any proposals to alter
the present distribution of soil conservation subsidies, it is important to
rec~gnize that such approaches are essentially noneconomic ones. A search
for lowest-cost per ton
over current practices,
should make to identify
opportunities to reduce erosion offers an improvement
but represents only half the evaluation economists
areas most in need of conservation practices.
Research focusing on the economics
level is another important component in
policies. Since analysis at this level
of soil conservation at the farm
the development of effective targeting
is concerned solely with costs and
benefits incident on the individual farm enterprise, the problem of estimating
off-site damages can be avoided and the analysis made much more tractable.
As a result, a number of studies utilizing traditional farm management
research techniques have attempted to determine the relative profitability of
different degrees of erosion reduction through a variety of conservation
practices on a range of different soils and topography. While subject to some
of the data problems relating to soil movement and loss mentioned earlier,
such farm level approaches to the economics of erosion control hold much
promise. One aim of such research should be to gain insight into the extent
to which farmers in different areas face different private economic incentives
to control soil erosion, and the sensitivity of those private incentives to-8-
changes in planning horizons, personal discount rates, input and output
prices, and production and conservation technologies.
The analysis of physical and economic data together holds great
potential for achieving a more efficient allocation of soil conservation
funds. It should aid in the systematic identificationof areas in which the
net benefits to society of reductions in soil loss are greatest, and suggest
the degree to which farmers in those areas can be expected to act out of self
interest to reduce erosion in the absence of any public intervention. The
result should be to identify those geographic areas in which the marginal
returns to society of public subsidies to conserve soil would appear to be
the greatest. A number of intervening factors can influence the effectiveness
of conservationpolicies built on these two parameters alone. Individual
farmers’ soil conservation decisions are conditioned by a variety of
influences that are difficult to include in models but are nonetheless
critically important to the ultimate success or failure of voluntary erosion
control policies. It is thus appropriate to include a third dimension of
analysis in the development of effective targeting strategies.
Institutional‘Parameters
A variety of legal, cultural, and social influences, broadly defined as
“institutions,”are important in molding farmers‘ attitudes and behavior
toward land use and soil conservation (Barlowe,1978). Government policies
on taxation, agricultural price and income supports, and those influencing the
allocation and pricing of credit exert great influence over production decisions.
Cultural and religious factors influence farmers’ attitudes toward soil
stewardship and their responsibilitiesto their neighbors and to future-9-
generations. The level and type of education that farmers receive affects
their ability to implement technologicallycomplex conservation practices.
And arrangements,both formal and informal, that allocate rights to the control
and ownership of land are important in shaping resource use, by influencing
time preferences and the distributionof returns from conservation investments.
Each of these factors may exert profound influences over farmers’
perceptions of the returns, both monetary and nonmonetary, from soil
conservation,and thus on their willingness to implement such measures on
their own. A better understanding of the effects of these variables can aid
in the identificationof those farm owners or operators who, at least on the
basis of some institutionalclassification,would appear to control soil
erosion at desired levels without public intervention. Such an understanding
could also provide valuable insights into the nature and extent of government
involvement necessary to induce voluntary participation,be it education,
technical assistance or the payment of cash subsidies. It may also suggest
institutionalinnovations that could promote conservation goals at lower cost.
There are a number of difficulties involved in the investigationof
institutional influences on soil conservation. Relevent data in many cases
are difficult or impossible to obtain, and that wrtichis available may not
capture the salient features of the institutions in question. Bromley (1980)
noted in commenting on one such effort that
.** ownership classes are legal descriptionswhich
attempt to define different types of decision units,
when in fact they merely define different types of
income and cost accounting practices. I am skeptical
that institutionalarrangements designed for tax
purposes are relevent to how people use their soil
resource. (p. 1089)
Problems may also arise in isolating the effects of particular arrangements.-1o-
Does the conservation performance of large, corporate farms relate more to
their legal status or size, or to some third factor? Is soil erosion on
small farms a function of their size, or the family’s income or education,
or the mix of enterprises, or other factors, and to what degree is each
important? The individual impacts of particular phenomena are difficult to
assess. Nevertheless, there are important insights to be gained from such an
exercise which can aid in the development of effective soil conservation
policies. A better understanding of the general influences of some common
institutionalparameters can aid in focusing current conservation efforts,
and suggest the likely impacts on soil conservation of long term changes in
the legal and economic organization of agriculture,
An appropriate soil conservation targeting strategy must therefore
rest on three types of parameters. Data describing the physical processes
associated with soil erosion, in as fine a detail as possible, must serve
as the foundation. Relating values to the physical quantities involved
will allow priorities to be set based on the costs and benefits to society
of erosion control in given areas and to suggest the degree of control that
would be optimal. Physical and economic data together can thus be used to
identify those areas where erosion control is most critical. Institutional
parameters can then aid in the third important level of analysis, that of
identifying farm owners and operators for whom public intervention can be
most effective in meeting society’s conservation goals. Institutional
analysis thus affords the possibility of developing the most effective
soil conservation targeting policy: one that focuses on “critical people”
within “critical regions.” The next section includes a discussion of the
impacts of one such group of institutionalarrangements on soil conservation-11-
practices, that of ownership and control of farmland.
Land Tenure Charzh2teristics and Soil Erosion
The concept of land &enure concerns the many relationships established
among people that determine their varying rights to control, occupy, and use
landed property (Barlowe,1978), The impact of these various relationships
on the extent to which good soil conservation practices are followed is a
topic that has long held the interest of economists, and it has attracted
renewed attention with the recent rekindling of the debate over the
evolving structure of American agriculture. In the following pages, both
theoreticaland empirical evidence bearing on the links between soil
erosion and some common tenure arrangements will be examined. Implications
for soil conservation policies will be drawn where possible, and topics for
further investigationwill be suggested.
Farm Tenancy
The impact of tenancy on farmers’ soil conservation behavior has
~/
been of interest for many years, and has probably been the most studied
tenure institution in relation to soil erosion. A number of economists have
considered the effects of farm tenancy from a theoretical perspective. Bunce
(1942), among others, suggested that the insecurity of tenure that often
accompanies farm leasing encourages exploitation of the soil. Ciriacy-Wantrup
(1952) also emphasized this point, noting that by introducing shorter planning
2/
— George Washington, for example, wrote in 1784 that he would lease
none of his land to his neighbors, “for this obvious reason, that the weight
of their labour, and burden of their Crops, whilst it was in a condition to
bear them, would fall upon my Land, and the improvement upon his own.”
Writings of George Washington (Washington,DC: Government Printing Office,
1938), ~~1, p. 344, cited in Raleigh Barlowe (1J78): Land Resource Economics
(EnglewoodCliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall),p, 495, ‘—-12-
horizons of the tenants, conservation problems arise in cases where all
expected revenues and costs functionally related to the actions of the
tenant are not incident upon him. The tendency in such cases will be toward
underinvestment in soil conservation. Ciriacy-Wantrup suggesEed that these
obstacles could be overcome by the in~roductionof long term leases and the
principle of compensation for deferred revenues and costs, and by policies
to encourage the ownership of farms by their operators.
More recently, McConnel (1983) has applied principles of optimal
control theory to derive conditions under which the interests and behavior
of tenants and owners can be expected to diverge. Two assumptions are
important to his analysis. First, he assumes that owners and renters have
equal planning horizons. Second, he assumes that farm real estate values
accurately reflect the effects of past soil conservation practices,
erosion progressively lowers the eventual resale value of farmland.
farm owners seek to use (erode) their soil resources at a rate that





farm, they face higher user costs from soil loss than do renters, who seek
only to maximize the flow of annual returns. Under these circumstances
rented farms can be expected to suffer more erosion than owner operated farms.
A number of investigatorshave attempted to validate empirically the
relationshipbetween farm tenancy and soil conservation. Two general
approaches to this problem have predominated. One has been to use the
techniques of farm enterprise analysis (generallylinear programming) to
identify those soil conservation practices that are profitable to individual
farm operators over time, and from these results to make judgments about-13-
the relative attractiveness ~f conservation to owners and renters (Seitz
et al, 1979; Erwin and Washburn, 1981; Banks, et al, 1983), .— The second ——
approach has been to utilize data on the actual use of conservation practices
or rates of erosion, at varying levels of”aggregation, to search for
differences in farmers’ treatment of owned and rented cropland (Frey, 1952;
Lee, 1980; Erwin, 1982).
The use of optimizationmodeling to provide insights into farmers’
soil conservation decisions is of comparativelyrecent origin. It was
spurred by the difficulty that researchers encountered in interpreting the
results of analyses of actual farms, due to the confounding of the effects
of soil conservationwith those of other practices (Seitz and Swanson, 1980).
The most frequent approach has been to model the problem as one of income
maximization constrained by different allowable levels of soil loss. The
general conclusion of these studies has been that investments in soil
conservation, particularly those requiring large initial capital outlays, do
not return great
which focused on
much of the Corn
dividends to individual farmers. One such
an area in Illinois chosen to be generally
Belt, concluded that typical farmers there
study, for example,
representativeof
would not find it
profitable to adopt soil-conservingpractices unless their planning horizon
exceeded 40 years and they did not discount future earnings (Seitz et al, 1979). .—
If the farmers did discount future earnings at the relatively low rate of 5
percent, the planning horizon would need to be approximately 60 years. A
Missouri study reached similar conclusions, particularly with regard to
practices such as countour stripcropping and terracing, for which it was
found that the costs significantly outweighed the benefits (Ervtn and Washburn,
1981). Seitz and Swanson (1980),who have been very active in this area of-14-
research, have concluded that “In general, these studies support the weak
private economic incentive hypothesis.” (p. 1085)
One exception may be in the use of conservation tillage technologies.
Crosson (1981) concluded that under the price and other conditions
prevailing in 1979, conservation tillage enjoyed a cost advantage of 5 to
10 percent over conventional tillage, due largely to savings in labor.
Since it generally requires little or no investment in land improvements
or changes in cropping patterns, it can be compared directly with conventional
tillage on the basis of annual costs and returns. The length of the farmer’s
planning horizon would thus appear not to be critical to the
of conservation tillage.
This conclusion is supported by the results of a recent
profitability
study focusing
on the management decisions of owner operators and crop-share tenants on
a variety of Iowa soils (Banks et al, 1983). They assumed that maximization .—
of net annual returns in 1985 was the sole objective for both tenure classes
and that tenants enjoyed sufficiently long leases to realize the full return
from any conservation investments they made, The analysis suggested that
under most circumstances tenants face short-run incentives to adopt conservation
tillage practices which are at least equal to those faced by owner operators.
On some highly erosive soils, tenants whose leases require them to pay most
or all of the production expenses in exchange for their crop share may prove
even more inclined to adopt conserving practices than landlords. The analysis
also indicated that neither owners nor tenants would find structural practices
such as strip cropping or terraces to be profitable investments if only short-
run returns were considered.
Conservation tillage is not appropriate in all areas, however. On poorly-15-
drained soils or where perennial weeds are a severe problem, the practice is
not as attractive (Crosson,1981). Tillage practices by themselves are
also not always sufficient LO control erosion at acceptable levels even
where practicable. Menz and Sundquist (1983) estimated that conservation
tillage practices are sufficient to reduce erosion to within tolerance
levels (based loosely on the rate at which topsoil is thought to be formed
naturally under good husbandry (Cook, 1982))on 83 percent of presently
cultivated Corn Belt soils. Additional supporting practices such as crop
rotations or terracing will be required on the remaining acres.
The distinction between soil conservation practices that provide
benefits in the year in which they are used, such as conservation tillage,
and those where the benefits are realized more slowly, such as contouring
or crop rotations, is critical. In the first case, tenancy would appear
to present no particular barrier to adoption, because the tenant is able to
recognize gains from the practice even within the context of a very short
planning horizon. In the case of conservation practices promising slower
returns, tenants have even less incentive than owners to adopt them. On
this basis, one would expect tenant operated farms to suffer higher levels
of erosion, relative to erosion potential, than owner operated farms.
Empirical studies have generally confirmed that renters treat farmland
differently than do owner operators. In a study of obstacles to soil erosion
control in western Iowa in 1950, Frey (1952) concluded that farm tenancy was
a significant barrier to conservation. The percentage of land in row crops,
which are highly erosive, was much higher on tenant operated than on owner
operated farms. More than a third of the farmers surveyed listed their rental
arrangement as the reason they did not practice more soil conservation. More-16-
recently, Kraft (1978) surveyed a group of New York farmers and obtained
similar results. The farmers, who rented on average one third of the acreage
they operated, tended to manage their rented land much differently than
their owned land. For example, they frequently grew corn on rented land for
four to six years continuously as opposed to one or two years on their own
land. Significantly,the farmers surveyed indicated that when they purchased
land that they had formerly rented, they changed their cropping patterns by
establishingmore forage crops on the steeper slopes and moving to shorter
corn rotations on the more level parcels. Both of these practices can be
effective in reducing erosion.
Research focusing on the use of conservation practices such as terraces,
grassed waterways, and contour farming, which tend to provide returns more
slowly, has yielded more ambiguous evidence on the effects of tenancy.
This is probably a reflection of the results obtained by optimization
modeling, indicating that such investments are frequently only marginally
profitable even for those owners who expect to hold their property for many
years. A study of a watershed in northeast Nebraska, chosen because of the
high rate of erosion it currently suffers, found no significant differences
in the number of such conservation practices used on land operated by owners
or tenants (Hoover and Wiitala, 1980). On the other hand, Baron (1981), in a
study based on questionnairescompleted by nearly 7,000 landowners in the
Corn Belt, Delta, and Northern and Southern Plains production regions, concluded
that landowners who operated at least a portion of their land were much more
likely to have invested in conservation practices than nonoperators leasing
their land for cash. Neither of these studies considered the amount of money
invested in conservation practices, the amount of land affected, or their-l!7-
effectivenessin reducing erosion.
A study of one county in Missoui’i(Ervin, 1982) revealed that the
percentages of conservation practices were significantlyhigher on owner
operated land for terraces, grassed waterways, contour farming, and crop
rotations with hay or pasture. No statistically significant difference
was found in the use of conservation tillage by the two tenure classes,
however. Ervin also calculated actual erosion rates on owned and rented
farms using the USLE, His analysis, based on a random sample of 120 farms,
showed that erosion was 40 percent higher on rented land, despite higher
erosion potential on the owned land.
Lee (1980; Lee and Stewart, 1983) has used merged data from the 1977
National Resources Inventory and the 1978 Landownership survey to search for
differences in soil conservation practices among tenure groups. Her earlier
(1980) analysis focused on the impact of landownership arrangements on
observed rates of soil erosion at the farm production region level. The
results indicated that only in the Northeast region were average erosion
rates on rented cropland significantlyhigher than on owner operated
cropland. Differences in erosion rates among tenure groups in other regions
were not statisticallysignificant. It is difficult to draw conclusions about
the effect of tenure institutions on soil conservation behavior from these
results, however, since the data used did not allow the effects of management
practices to be separated from those of physical factors.
Lee and Stewart’s subsequent (1983) investigation of tenure status and
conservation tillage, using the same data bases revealed that part-owner
operators had significantlyhigher proportions of their total acreage under
conservation tillage practices than did full-owner operators, This relationship-M-
held across all farm production regions, although it appears to be heavily
influenced by the larger average size of farms operated by part-owners. The
implication is that farm sizei rather than tenure status, may be the most
important variable in determining use of”conservation tillage.
The weight of the empirical evidence thus appears to support the
proposi~ion’ that farm tenancy tends to impede the adoption of those soil
conservation practices’ requiring large initial investments or imposing large
opportunity costs on the tenant, but has little effect on operators’
chxi.sion to use conservation tillage.
On this basis, the distinc~ton between conservation tillage, for which
tenancy doe~ not appear to present obstacles to adoption, and other longer-
term investments in soil conservation hold important implications for
developing effective targeting policies. In those areas in which the desired
level of erosion control can be achieved solely through the use of conservation
tillage practices, there is liktle reason for policymakers to focus their
attention on farm tenants as a group. In such areas, factors other than
the tenure status of the farm operator may be
of conservation tillage, These might include
the willingness and ability to use herbicides
conservation tillage.
most important to the adoption
receptivity to innovation, and
necessary for successful
In areas requiring more intensive treatment such as contouring, terracing,
or switching to high-forage crop rotations, however, there appear to be clear
differences in the degrees to which owner operators and tenants face private
economic incentives to control erosion. This in turn influences the extent
to which each tenure group can be expected to practice conservation in the
absence of government intervention. Thus a number of important questions arise-19-
concerning the most appropriate targets for additional conservation incentives.
Ervin (1982),based on his study of erosion on owned versus rented cropland,
has suggested that public conservation’ programs should focus on farm tenants
by offering them cost sharing for capital improvements to reduce soil loss.
On the other hand, it has alsa been suggested that landlords are the group
meriting the most attention from policymakers, on the grounds that they have




educational efforts can make them more aware of (Barkley,1982; McConnel, 1983).
Landowners would then be expected to require better soil
their tenants. This issue has been given added urgency
separation between the ownership and control of farmland
the 1970’s (Raup, 1982).
The debate seems to turn on the degree to which farm real estate values
reflect the extent of past soil conservation practices. If soil depth
(as a measure of past erosion) does affect farm values, then educating landlords
about that fact could be an effective policy instrument. If soil depth does
not affect land values, or affects them only partially so that conservation
investments are not profitable, then there is little evidence with which to
educate landlords, and tenants are thus the proper focus of policy. The
actual relationship between soil conservation and farmland values has received
little or no attention from researchers in recent years. Such an analysis
could yield important insights for the formulation of conservation policy.
CasliVersus Share Rents
Within the institution of tenancy, the types of rental arrangements
employ4d have been thought to influence tenants’ patterns of resource use.-20-
Ciriacy-Wantrup (1952) concluded that under most circumstances a crop share
rent or a variable cash rent was preferable to a fixed cash rent from the
s~andpoint of soil conservatism. He argued that fixed charges tend to
speed resource depletion as compared with the case where the same amount is
paid over the course of an entire business cycle. During periods of lower
ccunmodity prices fixed charges increase the proportion of income allocated
to pay rents and reduce the prospective value of future production, thus
increasing depletion. This is not materially offset during boom periods,
he continued, because changes in income have smaller effects on time
preferences”as incomes increase. Applying this principle to farm leasing
arrangements,he suggested that fixed land charges such as cash rents were
obstacles to erosion control. The more equal sharing of risks between land-
lords and tenants under crop sharing mitigates the tendency toward
exploitation of the soil. The greater involvement of landlords in the
management of farms that is typical under crop share leases also offers the
possibility of better soil conservationby circumscribingmore closely
the production decisions of tenants (Johnson,1972).
A number of empirical studies have included lease type as an explanatory
variable in their models. Baron (1981) found that
production regions studied, landlords who operated
share basis were significantlymore likely to have
in three of the four farm
their property on a crop
made some kind of investment
in soil conservation than landlords using only cash leases. More localized
studies’havenot observed significant differences in soil conservation under
different lease types. Hoover and Wiitala (1980) reported that the type of
rental arrangement in effect on the Nebraska farms they sampled was not a
significant predictor of either the landlord’s perception of the severity
of erosion problems or of the number of conservation practices adopted. Ervin’s-21-
(1982) study of Missouri farms revealed that the type of lease used was not




the particular relationshipbetween types of rental arrangements and
conservation practices remains open to question.
The most important feature of cash renting as it relates to farmers’
conservation decisions fs the potential it raises for imposing high
fixed charges against the land resource. While the division of lease types
into cash and share rentals affords an approximation of the likelihood that
such conservation-deteringcharges against the land will arise, this phenomenon
is not an exclusive feature of cash rent leases. Institutionaldistinctions
that are useful in one context may be quite misleading in another. In
this case, the most analytically relevent variables would seem to be the
level and schedule of payments made by the farm operator to secure control
of the land, whether holding legal title to the property or not.
A number of authors have made this point. Bunce (1942) noted that
high economic rents capitalized into land values created fixed charges
against land which would be difficult to meet in times of lower crop prices
without exploiting the soil. He spoke with the experience of the 1920’s
fresh in mind, when good soil husbandry was largely abandoned to pay off
mortgages taken on during the grain and land boom associated with World
War I. Ciriacy-Wantrup (1952) observed that
Farmers or ranchers who own their land but who are
obligated to pay high interest and amortization
charges may fear they will be dispossessed by their
creditors in times of drought or economic depression;
they have no more interest in soil conservation than
a tenant with a short lease. (p. 145)
High fixed costs, and the constraints that they impose against any-22-
sacrifices in current income for the sake of conservation goals, characterize
the situation facing much of agriculture in the mid-1980’s. Current farmland
values largely reflect the capitalizationof the rents and expectations of
a decade ago, at levels much higher than current returns would justify. Many
landowners acquired their property during the 1970’s (Lewis, 1980), often
lured by the prospect of future capital gains, and must now contend with the
cash flow difficulties resulting from falling farm incomes. Whether
operators or landlords, farmers in these circumstances face strong
incentives to abandon any conservation practices which reduce current income
and thus jeopardize their continued landownership. The most extreme
situation is that faced by those “owners” of farmland currently purchasing
their property under contracts for deed. Since &hey do not hold legal
title to the property their equity in it is less secure than those who
purchase under mortgages. Thus they find it rational to exploit the soil to
whatever degree necessary to make the contract payments and safeguard both
their paid equity in the contract and any increases in the property’s value
that have occurred since the contract was written. The purchaser has little
to gain and almost everything to lose from investing in soil conservation.
The insecurity of property rights under this arrangement thus creates a
climate that is extremely unfriendly to Che control of erosion, This holds
important implications for states like Minnesota, where in recent years 60
percent of all farmland transfers have utilized contracts for deed (Smith
and Raup, 1983).
Based on this understanding of the effects of fixed charges on conservation
decisions, one would expect that factors such as how long ago land was
purchased, the instrument used to obtain it, the price paid and the terms under-23-
which it is to be paid for would all exert powerful influences on the
degree to which soil conservation’ispracticed. Adjacent parcels of farmland
which are identical in all respects except the level of debt could vary
quite dramatically in the levels of”erosion which their owners would find
optimal to tolerate. This tendency would be
landowner’smanagement decisions in the case
for shares, or indirectly under cash tenancy
reflected directly by the
of owner operatorship or rental
through the landlord’s ability
to offer reduced rents to those tenants willing to practice conservation.
These issues merit the attention of researchers, Land payments are
one of the least flexible constraintswith which soil conservation policy
must contend, A better understanding of the circumstancesunder which
conservation investments become impossible from the landowner’s point of view
can aid in the development of effective targeting strategies. There are a
number of serious obstacles, however. Relevent data are no~ available at
present and would be extremely difficult to collect. This more than anything
else probably explains why researchers have often used cash renting as a
proxy for high fixed charges. Policies based on distinctions between the
financial situations of otherwise comparable owners would raise thorny
questions of equity as well. In the long run, policies aimed at achieving
a level of land values that is sustainable by agricultural incomes under
good soil management probably offers the best hope for promoting conservation
goals.
Farm Size
In recent years the view has been expressed by some of those involved
in the debate over the structure of American agriculture that large farms
practice less soil conservation than small farms (Farm Structure Project, 1980).-24-
Much of the economic literature, however, suggests that at least in theory
small farms constitute more of an obstacle than an aid to soil conservation.
Bunce (1942) argued that farms too small to support a family at an acceptable
standard of living were a major cause of soil exploitation. Ciriacy-
Wantrup (1952) suggested that the problem of high fixed rents was particularly
acute on smaller properties. Imperfections in loan markets and limitations
on managerial capacity and mobility~ among other factors, tend to make demand
for smaller properties greater then the potential income they can provide.
Rents are bid up, and depletion is hastened. On the other hand, one might
expect thar the large cultivating and harvest machinery typically used on the





contouring and terraces, because of the difficulties in
these structures with big equipment.
conceptual problems arise in evaluating the effects of farm
How does one define a small farm? If in terms of acres,
how many? Should one refer to the size of units operated, or the size of the
ownership units involved? Or should one define farm size in terms of gross
or net receipts? And how should the definition of small farms vary from one
region to the next? Separating the effects of farm size from those of other
factors, such as erosion potential, mix of enterprises, or the operator’s level
of education and willingness to innovate, also raises difficulties.
Empirical investigationshave reflected these dilemmas, with some
researchers using farm incomes and others using the acreage owned or operated
to define farm size.
income and erosion at
that among full owner
Lee (1980) examined the relationship between net farm
the national and regional levels. Her analysis indicated
operators, higher net farm income levels were associated-25-
with lower rates of erosion nationally and in five of the ten
regions. The association between farm income and erosion was
farm production
not significant
within other tenure groups. Lee noted that a much higher proportion of the
cropland owned by the lowest income groups was classified as erosion-prone
than that owned by the highest income group, In terms of management, on
the other hand, a much higher proportion of the land owned by the highest
income group was under conservation tillage practices. Differences in erosion
rates between income classes thus appear to reflect a combination of less
erosive soil and more conservation practices.
Studies defining farm size in terms of spatial extent have provided
little evidence that there is any connection between size and soil conservation.
Held and Timmons (1958) investigated twenty Iowa farms over a period of
years to determine if changes in farm size affected the degree to which
conservation practices were employed. They observed no clear pattern of
changes in erosion losses related to changes in farm size. Baron (1981)
tested for the effect of the number of acres owned on the number of investments
made in soil conservation, Tn three of the four farm production regions
sampled there was a sta~istically significant positive relationship between
size of ownership unit and the number of conservation investments adopted,
but with coefficients so small as to make
significance to them. Hoover and Wiitala
farms they surveyed, neither “total acres
it difficult to attach any practical
(1980) xeported that for the Nebraska
farmed” or “total acres owned” were
significant predictors of whether a farmer perceived an erosion problem
on his farm. They did not test for differences in actual rates of erosion
by size of farm. Ervin’s (1982) analysis of erosion on rented cropland inMissouri detected no




impacts on soil loss by the size of the
farmrented. A survey of New York and
Michigan farmers (Buttel et al, 1981) recorded somewhat higher levels of —.
concern about erosion amon~ those operating smaller acreages, but not at
statistically significant levels.
If there are any important effects of farm size on soil conservation
practices, they may lie in the use of conservation tillage. As noted above,
there is a farily
farm income (Lee,
terms of acres as
strong association between the use of the practice and net
1980), and thus by implication to farm size defined in
well. Choi and Coughenour (1979), in their study of the
adoption of no-tillage agriculture in Kentucky, provide some valuable insights
into the relationship between farm size and the adoption of new conservation
technology. They reported that in the county studied, nearly all of the
farmers operating 500 or more acres had tried no-till, but just slightly over
half of the farmers opera~ing 259 acres or less had done so. They cited a
number of barriers to the adoption of no-till on small farms. These included
the additional cost of a no-ttll planter, as well as lower opportunity costs
for the labor that could be saved by use of no-till. They also noted that
willingness to adopt the practice was positively related to the farmer’s
education level (as the practice demands much more expertise in chemical
use), which in turn is positively related to farm size.
Choi and Coughenour also offer evidence to indicate that conservation
ti.llage practices are most heavily used by aggressive, expanding farmers.
Between 1972 and 1977, 59 percent of those using no-till expanded the size of
their farms, versus only 17 percent of those who had never tried the practice.
This suggests that, contrary to the fears expressed by some, the growth in
the average size of farms may actually advance soil conservation goals by-27-
accelerating the spread of conservation tillage.
A bettierunderstanding of what barriers small farm size poses to the
adoption of conservation tillage practices could contribute to more effective
conservation policies. Research to identify the effects of particular
factors, such as the operator’s education, extent of off-farm employment,
attitudes toward risk, and the degree to which the cost advantages of
conservation tillage are affected by farm size, would be an important first
step in developing targeting strategies
situation faced by small farm operators
Conclusion
which are sensitive to the
making conservation decisions.
This paper has outlined an approach to targeting soil conservation
policies that rests on an analysis of institutional as well as physical and
economic parameters. Although such an approach presents difficulties in
the collection, analysis, and interpretationof data in all of these
dimensions, it represents a framework for identifying those public invest-
ments in soil conservation offering the highest net returns to society,
Theoretical and empirical perspectives on the effects of tenure institutions
on soil conservationwere examined, and the implications for conservation
policy and opportunities for further research were discussed.
The obstacles to allocating soil conservation incentives based on
not only of tons of soil loss or proximity to a valuable river, but also
on the ownership status or debt level or size of a farm, must be granted.
Many will object to policies that make such distinctions, preferring instead
to leave the
that if soil
present distribution of benefits intact. It is equally clear
conservation goals are to be accomplished, the influences of-28-
institutionsmust be acknowledged andresponded to. To ignore them is to
risk the failure of soil conservation programs, Arthur C. Bunce (1942)
made this point more than forty years ago.
If, under the presentiinstitutional arrangements of
farm size, tiaxes, population density, and rents, a
level of living acceptable to the people cannot be
maintained when conservation is introduced, it is
a waste of public funds to attempt to induce con-
servation without remedying the basic maladjust-
ments. (p. 53)-29-
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